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Regulating Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)
Summary
Research led by the University of Pennsylvania Professor David Hoffman presents legal literature’s first
detailed analysis of the inner workings of Initial Coin Offerings (ICO). Startups are using the novel funding
mechanism with increasing frequency. In 2017, an estimate 370 ICOs raised around $6.2 billion, and by
July 2018, an additional 430 ICOs had raised almost $17.2 billion. ICOs come with the promise of a
“smart contract”, or an automated contract that governs real world relationships where before a legal
document would have been employed. Human oversight is supposed to be unnecessary because the
embedded code ensures proper governance. But do ICOs actually deliver what they promise? Hoffman’s
team examines the white papers of the 50 top grossing ICOs from 2017 and compares the promises
made to the underlying code. ICO investors face a unique set of concerns, three of which are addressed in
detail: will promotors restrict the supply of their cyryptoasset, will they restrict the transfer of cryptoassets
according to a vesting or lock-up plan, and do promotors retain the power to modify the smart-contract
code governing the tokens sold? The findings are stark: ICO software code and ICO investor disclosures
often did not match. While ICOs are a potentially powerful financial innovation, this failure of selfgovernance reveals opportunities for policymakers consider options to protect consumers and help the
ICO market mature.
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In 2017, Bitcoin vaulted from the fringes of popular media to become one of the
ubiquitous financial stories of the year. The price of a single bitcoin hit nearly
$20,000—up from a nickel in 2010—as widespread demand for cryptocurrencies
(and information about them) skyrocketed.1
With this rise in price and interest, the technology
underlying Bitcoin has evolved significantly, enabling
a range of new projects with more advanced features.
This innovation has led to the explosion of another
“crypto” phenomenon that has received comparatively
much less mainstream attention than the Bitcoin
craze: the ICO, or Initial Coin Offering. It is
important that policymakers understand that 2017 was
not just the year of Bitcoin; it was also the beginning
of an ICO tidal wave.
The largely unregulated process known as an ICO
allows a start-up, or even an established corporation, to
mint2 and sell its own digital “token” to raise funds—
either in the form of cash or another cryptocurrency
like Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Ripple—thus bypassing
traditional capital markets and avenues for venture
financing. But unlike its namesake, the IPO, an
ICO does not typically involve the sale of equity in
(or governance rights pertaining to) a corporation.
Instead, ICO participants buy an asset—a token—
that enables its holder to use or govern a network
that the promoters plan to develop with the funds
raised through the sale.3 It would be as if Coca-Cola

SUMMARY
• Initial Coin Offerings (the process for raising funds for a
business venture through the establishment and sale of a new
cryptocurrency) are attracting a great deal of interest—in 2017
alone, an estimated 370 ICOs raised around $6.2 billion—but
they are not well understood.
• ICO transactions are based on “smart contracts”: automated
rules, designed by programmers, to govern the functionality
of the digital cryptoassets sold in ICOs. In theory, transactions
based on smart contracts do not require human oversight, as
the computer code embedded in the contracts is supposed to
ensure proper governance.
• But an analysis of the 50 ICOs that raised the most capital in
2017 reveals a troubling trend: for many ICOs, the software
code does not deliver what the ICO promises in its investor
disclosure documents. ICO code often fails to ensure key investor
protections, and sometimes provides founders with significant,
undisclosed authority to alter investor rights.
• Currently, there is no ICO regulatory regime comparable to
what the SEC and state securities regulators provide for IPOs.
Policymakers would do well to develop a regulatory environment
that can help the ICO market mature, particularly in the accurate
encoding of smart contracts. But they first will need to understand
who is on the buy side of ICO transactions— and whether they
warrant protection.
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FIGURE 1 ICO CAPITAL RAISED IN 2017 (BY MONTH)
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Coinschedule.com/stats estimates that 371ICOs raised over $6.24 billion in 2017.

had funded its initial deployment of
vending machines through the sale
of tokens its machines might one day
require. For ICOs, however, the tokens
and the “machines” they operate are
digital. They exist on the Internet,
embodied in software code.
ICOs expand the role played
by computer code in governing
transactional relationships. Laws,
regulations, contracts, and commercial
norms heavily mediate traditional
capital market transactions. ICO
transactions promise to augment, and
perhaps replace, those intermediaries
by embedding controls within “smart
contracts.” These smart contracts—
automated, “if-this-then-that” rules

that programmers can design to
govern the functionality of the digital
cryptoassets sold in ICOs—are the
key forms of software driving this
innovation.4 Smart contracts may
be digital and automated, but they
structure real-world relationships.
ICOs are therefore both a financial
innovation and a technological
one, where promoters attempt to
effectuate their promises to investors
through computer code, rather than
by traditional contract. At the same
time, the smart contracts on which
ICOs are built may be a regulatory
innovation: human oversight of
these transactions is supposed to be
unnecessary because the embedded

computer code ensures proper
governance.
That ICOs are a potentially
powerful financial tool is undeniable.
Already they have enabled a widened
range of potential investors to support
the development of new, softwarebased enterprises.5 In 2017, an
estimated 370 ICOs raised around
$6.2 billion.6 By July of 2018, an
additional 430 ICOs had raised
almost $17.2 billion.7 At the same
time, though, ICOs are ripe for fraud
and exploitation. Government-led
ICO investigations at both the federal
and state levels have resulted in
criminal charges for fraudulent and
unregistered sales.8
Given the amount of capital in
play, and the clear existence of at
least some bad actors in the ICO
marketplace, legislators and regulators
would be right to question the quality
of ICOs. Do ICOs actually deliver
what they promise? Answering that
question carries significant policy
implications, and requires that we take
a closer look at the smart contracts
that make ICOs possible.9
In the first detailed analysis of
the inner workings of ICOs, we
surveyed the 50 ICOs that raised the
most capital in 2017. Simply put,
ICO software code and ICO investor

NOTES
See, e.g., Google Trends, using search terms such as
“Bitcoin” and “Cryptocurrency.”
2 Minting is the process of creating new cryptoassets (i.e.,
tokens or coins). Often, the new coins created for an ICO
are minted using the system established by Ethereum,
using that community’s coding standards (specifically
“ERC-20”).
3 While an ICO can occur after a network has been built, the
core practice is to raise funds pre-development.
4 Smart contracts were first introduced by Nick Szabo, who
drew inspiration from the “humble vending machine,”
1

in “Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public
Networks,” FIRST MONDAY, Sept. 1997. Today, smart
contracts exist on the Ethereum blockchain. Some are
written in a complex, hard-to-read coding language known
as byte code.
5 Nathaniel Popper, “Dealbook: Easiest Path of Riches on the
Web? An Initial Coin Offering,” The New York Times (June
23, 2017).
6 We have observed a number of instances where reports of
market capitalization greatly exceed what we have been
able to identify on blockchain explorers like etherscan.

2

io. Solely to ease exposition, we use market values (in US
dollars) reported by widely used coin data sites.
7 All data is from Coinschedule.com.
8 For background on federal and state investigations
of ICOs, see http://fortune.com/2017/12/04/
cryptocurrency-bitcoin-sec-ico-scam/ and https://
www.clearyfintechupdate.com/2018/03/around-worldicos-icos-united-states/ (discussing SEC enforcement);
and http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/734604/
fin+tech/Update+Cryptocurrency+Cybercrimes+And+ICO
+Enforcement+Actions (highlighting NASAA and Colorado

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

disclosures often do not match. In
a financial ecosystem built around
the proposition that regulation is
unnecessary because code is the final
guarantee of performance, the absence
of coded governance protections is
troubling. We further discovered
that at least some popular ICOs
not only have retained the power to
modify their tokens’ rights, but also
have failed to disclose that ability in
plain English. In this Issue Brief, I
summarize the results of the research I
conducted with several colleagues and
offer some specific considerations for
the future gatekeepers and regulators
that this space needs.10

THE THREE PROMISES OF
COIN PROMOTERS
In the traditional IPO context, the
SEC and state securities regulators
oversee issuer activity from soup to
nuts. As of 2017, no similarly clear
regime was in place for ICOs. In
lieu of the heavily lawyered products
of IPO documentation, the ICO
market coalesced on an informal
document known as a “white paper.”11
Cryptoasset white papers are public
documents, hosted on issuers’ websites,
which describe promoters’ plans for

development and solicit community
involvement. The legal status of such
documents is unclear.
We analyzed the relationship
between the “paper” promises made
by ICO promoters in their offering
documents and white papers, and
the actual functionality of the digital
assets they deliver. We established
actual functionality by examining the
smart contracts associated with each
ICO, along with the broader software
environments (i.e., “distributed
ledgers” or “blockchains”12) through
which those smart contracts function.
The fifty firms we studied raised a
total of $2.6 billion in revenue at their
ICOs, and the notional initial market
cap was $3.8 billion. The business
sectors in the sample varied, with
most being located in infrastructure
(14), trading (8), payments (7), and
other aspects of finance (5).13 In the
sample, 12 (25%) were headquartered
in the United States, 9 (19%) in
Switzerland, and the remaining
in variety of countries, including
Singapore (5), England (2), Russia (2),
Estonia (2), and Thailand (2). By May
of 2018, six of the projects had not
released any kind of alpha version or
demo of their project.
We evaluated our sample on
three aspects of governance that

ICO proponents have claimed can be
delivered through code, and which
economic theory suggests should be
salient to ICO investors. Without
spending a large sum of money
purchasing the time and know-how
of a very motivated and talented
reverse engineer, an investor would be
restricted to relying on these promises
as articulated in promoters’ white
papers and sales documents.

data storage, energy & utilities, finance, gambling &
betting, gaming & VR, health care, identity & reputation,
infrastructure, legal, social media, trading & investing, and
payments. We use the sectors provided by Coinschedule.
com.
14 For example, there is no cap on the amount of ether that
can be created. Indeed there is heated debate about
whether this is a desirable feature of Ethereum or not.
15 The story of a project called Matchpool demonstrates
how the absence of coded vesting rules can result in
mischief. Within days of a reported $5.7 million ICO, one

founder departed from the project and wrote that his
cofounder, the CEO, had withdrawn 37,500 ether from
the wallet without explanation. See Nick Tomaino, Tweet
(Apr. 5, 2017, 3:46 PM): https://twitter.com/NTmoney/
status/849755116156600321.
16 Three remained in byte code, which we did not have the
capacity to read, and one, FileCoin, which raised the most
money in the sample ($257 million), has not released any
code or token.
17 Jonathan Rohr and Aaron Wright, “Blockchain-Based
Token Sales and the Democratization of Public Capital

• First, did ICO promoters make
any promises to restrict the supply
of their cryptoassets? Were these
promises enforced using smart
contracts? A purchaser’s protection
against wanton inflation of supply
comes directly from the cryptoasset
code. Maximum supply of a
cryptoasset can be specified and
enforced (or not) via the code
comprising the cryptoasset itself.
Supply caps are a typical part of an
ICO’s marketing materials, although
some cryptoassets lack this feature.14
• Second, did ICO promoters pledge
to restrict the transfer of any
cryptoassets allocated to insiders
according to a vesting or lock-up
plan?15 Were these pledges built
into smart contracts? A vast
majority of promoters in our sample
made vesting promises in their sales

NOTES
State enforcement actions).
e.g., Kevin Werbach, “Trust but Verify: Why Blockchain
Needs Law,” 32 Berkeley J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2018).
10 Issue Brief is based on Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman,
Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, “Coin-Operated
Capitalism”, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
11 Iris M. Barsan, “Legal Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings,”
3 Revue Trimestrielle Du Droit Financier 54 (2017).
12 Blockchains are the publicly or privately distributed ledgers
for cryptocurrencies.
13 All sectors in the top 50: commerce & advertising,
9 See,
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documents. Most vesting schemes
are time-based but provide few of
the other contractual conditions that
accompany traditional stock vesting.
Examining how vesting promises are
enforced using smart contracts–if at
all–sheds light on whether investors
should be confident that a project’s
key people will not run off with
their newly-raised capital.
• Third, did ICO promoters retain the
power to modify the smart-contract
code governing the tokens they
sold, and if so, did they disclose that
they had allocated themselves that
power? Because cryptoassets are
defined by smart contracts, whether
those smart contracts are modifiable
should profoundly impact price and
receive intense investor scrutiny.
But our data suggests investors
pay little attention to even simple
non-technical markers of quality;
it’s thus incredibly unlikely that they
have the technical skills to monitor
a development team’s use
of modification.

the need for wise intermediaries, VC
vetting, and regulators with teeth—it
is the immutable, transparent code
that enables (and creates) a trustless
but trusted market. Yet thus far, there
remain good reasons not to take
promoters at their word.

in marketing materials: only 7 of
the 50 firms discussed the token’s
modifiability in their marketing
materials or soft contracts. But
overall, 10 of the 50 firms permit
modification through their code,
60 percent of which (6 of 10) did
not discuss modification but still
encoded it.

THE RESULTS: PROMISES
UNFULFILLED

To sum up: there are significant
differences between code and
contract in our sample. These results
demonstrate that ICO code often fails
to deliver key investor protections,
and sometimes provides founders
with significant, undisclosed authority
to alter investor rights. While
ICOs are promoted by an industrial
community that espouses technolibertarian beliefs in the power of the
“trustless trust” and carefully designed
code, actual ICO practices do not
uphold that ideology. Promoters are
making governance claims modeled
on traditional equity-based rules
intended to reduce agency costs, but
they are not encoding those promises
into the decentralized systems
undergirding their projects’ purported
sky-high values.

These are the results of our analysis,
which compares promises made to
investors with cryptoasset software
and code. For each listed promotion,
we scrutinized the white papers, token
sale agreements, and computer code
posted by the promoters:
• Of the 50 tokens, we audited the
code of 46.16
• Overall, only about 2 in 3 firms
that we audited (31 of 46) encoded
a supply restriction, even though
about 90 percent (41 of 46)
promised it.
• Only 37 of the 46 auditable issuers
promised vesting in their marketing
documents or white papers. Of
those that promised to vest, the vast
majority (29 of 37) apparently did
not use smart contracts to encode
those rights.
• Modification is rarely discussed

An ICO that promises particular
governance terms but does not
encode them is not delivering on an
archetypal feature of this financial
form. According to those who argue
the ICO is novel—so novel as to deny
NOTES
Markets,” 97 Cardozo Leg. Stud. Res. Paper No. 527
(2018) (suggesting that failure to list code in an open
source site “may signal ulterior motives on the part of the
party selling the token”).
18 This has been the approach taken, for instance, by
regulators in China and South Korea.
19 Max Raskin, “The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts,” 1
Georgetown Law & Tech. Rev. 304 (2017) (arguing for a
light hand on smart contract regulation).
20 Jordan Pearson, “The Russians Who Allegedly Hacked the
DNC Mined Bitcoin to Fund their Operation,” Motherboard

(July 13, 2018).
Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen, & Talis J. Putnins, “Sex
Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity is Financed
Through Cryptocurrencies?” (unpublished manuscript).
22 Jongsub Lee, Tao Li, & Donghwa Shin, “The Wisdom of
Crowds and Information Cascades in FinTech: Evidence
From Initial Coin Offers,” (unpublished manuscript) (June
2018).
23 Christian Masiak, Joern H. Block, Tobias Masiak, Matthias
Neuenkirch, and Katja N. Pielen, “The Market Cycles of
ICOs, Bitcoin, and Ether,” (unpublished manuscript).
21
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See, e.g., Olga Kharif & Camila Russo, “Venture Capital
Surges Into Crypto Startups,” Bloomberg (Mar. 26, 2018).
25 On the contrary, economic theorists have recently begun
developing models that show the potential for cryptoassets
to unlock information and value for investors during the
early stages of an entrepreneurial venture. See note 21 in
my paper for more.
26 The obvious allusion is to ordinary contractual fine print.
See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David
R. Trossen, “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer
Attention to Standard Form Contracts,” 43 J. Legal Stud. 1
24
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WHO IS BUYING?
If investors know about the problems
we have identified, then the makeup
of the top 50 ICOs suggests that they
don’t much care. We would expect to
see (all else equal) higher capital raises
by teams that faithfully coded supply
and vesting protections, and also
disclosed their modification powers.
But we find no evidence of that effect
in our sample. It is also worth noting
that ICOs, like stocks, have developed
a wide range of secondary information
sources, including “ratings” websites.
But most of these raters do not vet
smart contract code, and there is
essentially no emphasis on checking
that coded governance actually
happens.17
So how should regulators,
legislators, and scholars think about
these problems? Some see evidence of
fraud and call for the whole market
to be shut down.18 Others would
like the state to keep out.19 For the
pragmatists out there, the answer
depends a lot on who is investing in
ICOs, and why.
We see four archetypal
participants on the buy-side in the
ICO market. Each has different
implications for how to interpret the
sell-side picture we have painted in

this Issue Brief. Gaining a better read
on the precise ratios and combinations
of each will be a key next step for
policymakers who deal with ICOs.

3. CRYPTO GAMBLERS:

A lot of people have jumped
headlong into cryptocurrencies. A
bubble would be the least surprising
and most manageable version of the
ICO market we are living through.
Regulators would simply need to
focus on popping the bubble with
better informational requirements.

ICOs might serve as a decent
place for “Bitcoin millionaires”—
investors who raked in large gains
on early investments in Bitcoin and
Ethereum—to park and diversify
winnings that are trapped in crypto
purgatory. Or, investors could just be
gambling with house money. There
is preliminary evidence supporting
this idea. Specifically, one time-series
analysis suggests that blockbuster
ICOs have negative effects on Bitcoin
and Ether prices.23

2. CRIMINALS:

4. SMART MONEY:

Many signs suggest that a material
portion of cryptoasset demand is
driven by money-launderers, tax
evaders, and other holders of illicit
cash. Recently, this has been made
salient by allegations that Russian
hacking of the Democratic National
Committee in 2016 was bought and
paid for using Bitcoin.20 Indeed, one
recent paper found that approximately
half of all Bitcoin transactions were
associated with some form of illegal
activity.21 Another found that the
imposition of “Know Your Customer”
policies designed to enforce tax and
anti-money laundering laws shrank
ICO returns.22

Anecdotal reports indicate that a
wide range of old-growth VC firms,
hedge funds, and family offices are,
in fact, investing in ICOs.24 Are
“smart money” investors doing the
heavy analytical lifting in the ICO
market? It is hard to say. If that were
the case, we would expect to see
greater price sensitivity to promoters’
broken promises. Smart money
investors would have the best access to
sophisticated technical tools used to
monitor what ICO teams are actually
doing with their software code—and
whether they are making good on
promises in their sales documents.
Based on the strong evidence
that smart money is not leading

1. BUBBLE SPECULATORS:

NOTES
(2014) (finding vanishingly low reading rates for traditional
contracts).
27 The SEC, with its newly developed “Cyber Unit,” is
increasingly active in patrolling the scene. Other
regulators, along with courts, will also contribute to
increasing formalization of ICO code standards. See Press
Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to
Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors
(Sept. 25, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2017-176.
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this market, it can be tempting to
cast doubt on all aspects of ICOs,
including smart contracts. Though
it will take future research to prove
it, the ICO buy side today looks like
a mixture of a bubble and an illicit
market, with some smart money
riding its coattails.

TAKEAWAYS FOR
POLICYMAKERS
ICOs are not inherently a scam, and
smart contract code has enormous
promise as a regulatory innovation.25
But their promise and their present
form are miles apart. Policymakers
might do well to look beyond
the bubble (and its certain fate)
and help the ICO market mature
beyond this first experiment in
blockchain governance. Here is what
policymakers should take away from
our findings:
Before all else, unmask the buyers.
Optimal regulation depends heavily
on a better understanding of the buy
side of the market. Policymakers need
to know whether a substantial fraction
of market activity raises genuine
consumer protection concerns, or
if the market is driven by money
laundering and or other illicit activity
instead. While the bursting of the
ICO bubble would certainly provide
some insight, proactive investigations
could be more enlightening.
Policymakers should consider building
out regulatory capacity to police this
market.

THE BIGGEST FLAW WITH
ICOS: NO ONE READS SMART
CONTRACTS
Code has the potential to be a
substitute and complement for
legalistic governance mechanisms
in financial contracting, but smart
contracts are extremely difficult to
read and, in practice, no one actually
reads them.26 The community of
people who are able to vet and audit
smart contracts has much room
to grow. As it does grow, and as
existing institutions develop vetting
capacity, we would expect to see
quality improve. Smart contract code
was supposed to render traditional
intermediaries useless, obviate the
need for regulation, and reduce
transactions costs for participants.
Without those justifications—or
without a move in the direction of
regulation—it is difficult to see ICOs
as anything other than regulatory
arbitrage.

INVESTORS AND HONEST
COIN PROMOTERS WANT
INTERMEDIARIES
Some firms are encoding their
promises, though it’s not obviously
rewarding to do so. Others are
working to create intermediaries
and certification regimes despite
the contrary incentives present in
a sharply rising market. Although
our research shows that computer
code is not presently a reliable part
of the ICO form, it also strongly
suggests that an increased presence of
gatekeepers and regulators might help
that process along. The rise of trusted
intermediaries appears to be the next
6

necessary step in the maturation of
the ICO market.27

REWARDING GOOD ACTORS
SHOULD BE AS IMPORTANT
AS PUNISHING FRAUDSTERS
On the one hand, creating new coins
and selling them through an ICO is
a project that is ripe for fraud and
should be policed. On the other hand,
smart contracts and blockchains
may end up being as revolutionary
as their proponents suggest, so it is
important to support a regulatory
environment that rewards honest
actors for accurately encoding
promises made to investors, without
creating new barriers to entry that
protect first-movers. For these efforts
to be successful, it is imperative for
policymakers to understand the
contours of ICO transactions, and the
institutional environment in which
they take place, in detail.
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